Encryption Technology: Congressional Issues by Nunno, Richard M.
Congressional Research Service  ̃The Library of Congress
CRS Issue Brief for Congress
Received through the CRS Web
Order Code IB96039
Encryption Technology:  Congressional Issues 
Updated July 9, 1998
Richard M. Nunno










Action in the 105th Congress
H.R. 695:  Security and Freedom Through Encryption (SAFE)
S. 376:  Encrypted Communications Privacy Act (ECPA)
S. 377: Promotion of Commerce On-Line in the Digital Era (PRO-CODE)
S. 909: The Secure Public Networks Act
Senate Judiciary Committee Hearings
S. 2067: Encryption Protects the Rights of Individuals from Violation and Abuse in
Cyberspace (E-PRIVACY) Act
H.R. 1903: The Computer Security Enhancement Act of 1997







Congressional Research Service     ̃   The Library of Congress
Encryption Technology:  Congressional Issues
SUMMARY
Fundamentally, the controversy over nies believe U.S. export policies hurt their
encryption concerns what access the govern- market share while helping foreign companies
ment should have to encrypted stored com- that are not subject to export restrictions.
puter data or electronic communications Many businesses and consumer groups agree
(voice and data, wired and wireless) for law that key recovery is desirable when keys are
enforcement purposes. lost, stolen, or corrupted, but want market
Encryption and decryption are methods the development of key recovery encryption
of using cryptography to protect the confiden- products.  They also object to government
tiality of data and communications.  When having any role in determining who can hold
encrypted, a message only can be understood the keys.
by someone with the key to decrypt it. Busi-
nesses and consumers want strong encryption In September 1997, the debate shifted to
products to protect their information, while the add the prospect that the domestic use policy
Clinton Administration wants to ensure the could change.  On September 3, FBI Director
law enforcement community’s ability to moni- Louis Freeh raised the possibility of requiring
tor undesirable activity in the digital age. encryption products manufactured in or im-
The Administration’s policy promotes the recovery features and opened the possibility
use of strong encryption, here and abroad, as that key recovery could be enabled by the
long as it is designed with “key recovery” manufacturer, not only the user.  The Adminis-
features where a “key recovery agent” holds a tration insists its policy hasn’t changed.  On
“spare key” to decrypt the information.  The September 11, the House Intelligence Commit-
Administration would require key recovery tee marked up H.R. 695 with an amendment
agents to make the decryption key available to similar to Freeh’s views.  On September 24,
duly authorized federal and state government the House Commerce Committee rejected a
entities.  Privacy advocates worry that law similar amendment.
enforcement entities would have too much
access to private information. All parties agree that encryption is essen-
The Administration has been using the use of the Internet, but there is little consensus
export control process to influence whether beyond that.  Seven bills on encryption or
companies develop key recovery encryption computer security have been introduced in the
products by making it easy to export products 105th Congress (H.R. 695, H.R. 1903, H.R.
with key recovery, and difficult for those 1964, S. 376, S. 377, S. 909, and S. 2067).
products without.  Today there are no limits Hearings have been held in several House and
on domestic use or import of any type of Senate committees. H.R. 695 has been re-
encryption, so the Administration has tried to ported by the five committees to which it was
influence what is available for domestic use referred. S. 909 was ordered reported on June
through export controls since most companies 19 but the report has not been filed.  The
do not want to create two products—one for House passed H.R. 1903 on September 16. 
U.S. use and another for export.  U.S. compa-
forces—not government directives—to drive
ported into the United States to have key




On May 12, Senator Ashcroft introduced S. 2067, the E-PRIVACY Act.  Although the
bill is generally viewed as pro-industry and pro-privacy, criticism has been voiced by some
electronic privacy groups over provisions that would create a “NET Center”in the
Department of Justice to assist law enforcement in keeping pace with encryption technology,
and that would make use of encryption to obstruct justice a federal crime.  Several meetings
took place in June among key Members, Administration officials, and computer industry
leaders to discuss this bill and the other encryption legislation.  
On July 7, the Administration announced plans to relax export controls for strong
encryption software without requiring provisions for key recovery, but only for financial
institutions in the 45 countries that have acceptable money laundering laws.  The
Administration has also announced plans to declassify two security algorithms used in the
Clipper chip, an encryption device used for unclassified but sensitive government
communications.
BACKGROUND AND ANALYSIS
Encryption, Computers, and Electronic Communications
Encryption and decryption are procedures for applying the science of cryptography to
ensure the confidentiality of messages.  Technically, the issue discussed here is cryptography
policy, but since encryption is the most controversial application of cryptography, it is the
term used popularly and herein.  (There are other methods of using cryptography to protect
confidentiality — steganography and “chaffing and winnowing” —  but constraints on the
length of this issue brief do not permit discussion of them.)
Encrypting messages so they can be understood only by the intended recipient
historically was the province of those protecting military secrets.  The burgeoning use of
computers and computer networks, including the Internet, now has focused attention on its
value to a much broader segment of society.  Government agencies seeking to protect data
stored in their databases, businesses wanting to guard proprietary data, and consumers
expecting electronic mail to be as private as first class mail, all want access to strong
encryption products.  Other users of electronic communications, for example cellular
(wireless) phone users who expect calls to be as private as wireline calls, also are showing
increased interest in encryption.  While encryption is uncommon for telephone users today,
the advent of digital telephone services (particularly Personal Communication Services, PCS,
a digital form of cellular telephony) is expected to make encrypted voice and data
communications over  telephones more common. 
Whether hardware- or software-based, an encryption product scrambles a message using
mathematical algorithms.  A corresponding key is needed to decrypt (unscramble) the
message, and the key itself also may be encrypted.  The algorithm is a series of digital
numbers (bits), and the level of difficulty of breaking the code (its “strength”) is usually





     Once called "key escrow," key recovery means that
when stored data or electronic communications are
encrypted, a third party has a copy of the key needed to
decrypt the information.  The third party is called a key
recovery agent (formerly a key escrow agent).  Key
recovery is widely regarded as useful in cases where a
key is lost, stolen or corrupted. Most parties to the
encryption debate agree that market forces will drive the
development of key recovery-based encryption products
for stored computer data because businesses and
individuals will want to be sure they can get copies of
keys in an emergency.  It is less clear if market demands
will drive key recovery systems for electronic
communications. 
     The controversy is over government's attempt to
"encourage" the development of key recovery-based
products through the export control process, the
government's role in determining who can serve as key
recovery agents, and the extent to which law
enforcement agencies could obtain the key if they
suspect undesirable activity (terrorism, child
pornography, and drug cartels are often cited as
examples).
strength, but in this debate, bit length is used as a benchmark.)  Unencrypted data are referred
to as “plaintext.”  Encrypted data are “ciphertext.”
The National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), in conjunction with
industry, developed an encryption standard using a 56-bit key in 1977.  Called the Data
Encryption Standard (DES), it is widely used today in the United States and abroad, often in
an enhanced mode called “3-key triple DES” providing the equivalent of a 112- bit key.
NIST is currently working to establish a new, stronger standard than DES referred to as the
Advanced Encryption Standard (AES). The need for a stronger standard was underscored in
June 1997 when DES was broken (see below). 
Encryption products are widely
available today, including some that use
128-bit keys or more.  Some 128-bit
encryption software can be downloaded
from the Internet. There are no limits on
the strength of encryption products used in
the United States, whether acquired here
or imported.  The only limits are on
exports.  This indirectly influences what is
available domestically, however, since
most U.S. companies are reluctant to
develop two products, one for the U.S.
market and another for export.  For many
years, reflecting the policies of the past
three Administrations, the State
Department did not allow general exports
of encryption with better than 40-bit keys,
except for banking and U.S.-owned
subsidiaries (for a list of exceptions, see
CRS Report 96-232).  In December 1996,
the Clinton Administration temporarily and
conditionally raised the limit to 56 bits for
easily exportable encryption products that do not have key recovery features (see box), and
removed bit length limits entirely for products with key recovery.  Breaking a message
encrypted with a 40-bit key by “brute-force” (trying every possible combination of bits until
the correct one is found) is not considered difficult.   In January 1997, a Berkeley graduate
student broke a 40-bit key in 3.5 hours by linking together 250 computers.  It is 2  (65,536)16
times more difficult to break a 56-bit key than a 40-bit key.  In 1997, an ad hoc group
accomplished the task over 5 months by linking together thousands of computers.   Both
achievements were in response to a challenge from a prominent encryption product
manufacturer, RSA Data Security.  Opponents of encryption controls hope the demonstrated
vulnerability of 40- and 56-bit keys will influence the on-going encryption debate.
The limit of 40 bits remains for encryption products that do not incorporate key recovery
features and for which companies do not plan to create them. Business and consumer groups
consider 40-bit keys inadequate to ensure privacy and security.  They oppose export
encryption controls, or at least want increasingly higher limits on the bit length, without
regard to whether the product includes key recovery features.  They object to the government
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PROPONENTS AND OPPONENTS OF
ENCRYPTION EXPORT CONTROLS
Proponents include the Clinton Administration (notably the Department of Justice
and the National Security Agency) and others who are concerned about the ability
of terrorists and other criminal groups to conduct activities unmonitored if strong
non-key recovery encryption is widely available. 
Opponents include: 
•  computer hardware and software manufacturers who do not want to develop
separate products for domestic and foreign markets and worry they will lose
market share to foreign competitors who do not have to abide by such limits.
They also are concerned that no one may buy encryption products for which the
U.S. government can obtain the key.
•  U.S. businesses that want to use the same computer systems they have in their
home offices with their foreign clients; and 
•  privacy and consumer groups who want individuals to have access to the best
encryption possible without regard to key recovery features.  
using the export process to force the development of key recovery encryption products, rather
than allowing market forces to prevail, and to the government’s role in determining who can
serve as key recovery agents. These groups argue that strong encryption is needed, for
example, to enhance the prospects for electronic commerce and other uses of computer
networks.  The willingness of consumers to buy goods via the Internet could be markedly
affected by their beliefs as to whether credit card numbers will be secure. Businesses using
computers for either internal or external communications need to ensure that competitors or
other unauthorized parties cannot gain access to proprietary information.  Privacy advocates
argue that consumers should be assured that personal, medical and financial information
transmitted by or stored in computers will be protected.  They note that since 128-bit non-key
recovery encryption is available worldwide either by downloading it from the Internet or by
buying it from foreign firms, the U.S. government already has lost control of influencing its
availability.   A September 1997 survey conducted by Trusted Information Systems
[www.tis.com/docs/research/crypto/survey] shows 653 foreign encryption products available
from 29 countries (in addition to 948 U.S. products).  Of the foreign products, 275 employ
DES, demonstrating the widespread availability of strong encryption.   An April 1998 report
by the Economic Strategy Institute, Finding the Key, concluded that if the Administration’s
current policies remain in effect, the U.S. economy will lose $35-96 billion over the next 5
years (1998-2002) in lost encryption product sales; slower growth in encryption-dependent
industries; foregone cost savings and efficiency gains from the Internet, intranets, and
extranets; and indirect effects throughout the economy.
Supporters of en-
cryption export controls
agree that strong en-
cryption is needed  but
insist that law enforce-
ment and national secu-
rity concerns demand
that, when authorized,
the government be able
to intercept and decrypt
electronic communica-




ment and national se-
curity officials want to
ensure their ability to
access the plaintext of
the information.  The method most often discussed is to obtain the key needed to unscramble
encrypted information from key recovery agents.  Hence, they support strong encryption
products as long as they include key recovery features.  What they want to limit is the
development of strong non-key recovery products.  While conceding some strong non-key
recovery encryption products already are available, they claim use of these products is not
widespread.  They argue that while the U.S. government cannot prevent the availability of
strong non-key recovery encryption, at least it can be restrained, and future generations of
encryption products (with key recovery) will displace those now in use.
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Although the publicity surrounding the encryption debate so far has centered on access
to stored computer data, electronic communications are equally important to the law
enforcement and national security communities.   An Internet message, for example, is stored
data when it resides on a server or an individual’s computer, but it is an electronic
communication while it is being transmitted between computers.  The encryption export
regulations apply to products for encrypting other electronic communications, not just those
between computers.  Telephones, whether wired or wireless (such as cellular phones), are
also covered, for example.  The 1994 Communications Assistance to Law Enforcement Act
(CALEA, often called the “Digital Wiretap” Act, P.L. 103-414) requires telecommunications
carriers to ensure their equipment permits the interception of any electronic communication
by law enforcement officials.  If the communication is encrypted, law enforcement agencies
want to ensure they can decrypt it, too. (CALEA requires the telecommunications carrier to
provide decrypted information if the carrier itself is responsible for the encryption, but not if
the customer has encrypted it.)
Clinton Administration Policy
The Clinton Administration has strongly supported arguments by law enforcement and
national security agencies that the government must be able to gain access to the plaintext of
encrypted electronic data and messages when undesirable activity is suspected.  While there
is interest in international criminal activity, the Administration (notably the FBI) also wants
to be able to monitor domestic criminal activity.  U.S. policy has been to permit use of any
strength encryption, without a key recovery requirement, in the United States.  Rather than
attempting to change that policy directly, the Administration has been using the indirect route
of export controls to influence what types of encryption products are available, both here and
abroad.  However, on September 3, 1997, FBI Director Freeh raised the possibility of
imposing domestic use restrictions (see Senate Judiciary Committee).  Although the
Administration insists its policy hasn’t changed and Freeh was speaking only for the FBI, his
statement is viewed by many as a turning point in the encryption debate.
For many years, the Clinton Administration sought to restrain the development of strong
encryption products by not permitting export of better than 40-bit encryption (with a few
exceptions).  In the fall of 1996, it focused its policy on the need for strong encryption, as
long as it includes key recovery features.  The key recovery agent would be required to give
the key to duly authorized law enforcement officials if undesirable activity is suspected (the
three types most often cited are drug cartels, child pornographers, and terrorists).  
The Clinton Administration has tried several approaches to promote “voluntary” use of
key recovery agents. In April 1993, the Administration released its “Clipper chip” policy
requiring emplacement of special encryption computer chips (called Clipper) into new
government equipment for voice communications, with two government agencies, NIST and
the Department of Treasury, jointly serving as key escrow agents (each holds part of the key).
The Administration implemented this policy in 1994 for sensitive but unclassified voice
communications in the federal government through a Federal Information Processing
Standard (FIPS) called the Escrowed Encryption Standard (EES, or FIPS-185).
The Administration hoped that industry would accept the Clipper chip for its own use
on a voluntary basis, but industry strongly objected to the key escrow provisions, particularly
the fact that government agencies would hold the keys.  In July 1994, the Administration
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agreed to work with the private sector to develop a “voluntary” key escrow system for data
using “trusted third parties” as escrow agents instead of government agencies.  This proposal
is sometimes referred to by its detractors as “Clipper II.” 
Industry continued to object to the key escrow concept as well as the export controls,
leading to the legislation discussed below.  On May 20, 1996, the Administration released a
draft paper on encryption policy, followed by a July 12 statement by Vice President Gore.
Called “Clipper III” by its opponents, these documents outlined policy changes the
Administration was considering.  Among other things, the term “key recovery” replaced “key
escrow.”  The new term emphasizes the positive attributes of key escrow in providing a
means to recover a key that is lost, stolen, or corrupted.  Furthermore, “key escrow” had
come to be identified with the concept of the government holding the key.  Under the new
policy, a trusted third party (TTP) or an organization itself can serve that function (“self
escrow”), with some restrictions.
Current Policy
Vice President Gore formally announced those changes on October 1, 1996. The
associated executive order was signed November 15 and released along with a presidential
memorandum incorporating additional details of the policy.  Under the 1996 policy:
! The lack of restrictions on domestic use or import of any encryption continues;
! There is no algorithm or key length restrictions on the export of encryption products
if a key recovery system is in place for that product;
! For products without key recovery systems, 56-bit encryption products can be
exported after a one-time review for up to 2 years.  By then, the exporter must have
developed a key recovery system.  The license would be granted in 6-month
increments, to hold exporters to a required timetable to ensure the key recovery system
is being developed.  If key recovery systems are not produced, the export license will
not be renewed;
! Trusted parties must serve as key recovery agents, but in some cases, organizations
would be allowed to escrow the keys themselves (self-escrow) if they meet certain
requirements; and 
! Commercial encryption is removed from the Munitions List and responsibility for
commercial export licensing is transferred from the State Department to the Commerce
Department.  The Department of Justice has an advisory role in commercial encryption
export decisions.
The White House said that foreign governments could apply to U.S. courts to gain
access to keys, as they do now when seeking other types of evidence. 
On December 30, 1996, the Administration published an “interim final” regulation,
effective that day, transferring primary responsibility for commercial encryption export control
from the State Department to the Commerce Department.  The Commerce Department
expects modifications to this version in response to comments received, although revised
regulations have not been released.  Among the expected changes are waivers for banking and
other financial applications.  The relaxed restrictions on 56-bit encryption will end on
December 30, 1998, under existing policy.  Undersecretary of Commerce William Reinsch
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said at an April 24, 1998 meeting of the Congressional Internet Caucus that the government
is working with industry to develop a plan on how to proceed after that date.
On March 4, 1998, Vice President Gore wrote to Senator Daschle restating the
Administration’s desire for a “balanced approach” to encryption policy and seeking a “good
faith dialogue” to “produce cooperative solutions, rather than seeking to legislate domestic
controls.”  The letter added that the discussions could also enable additional steps to relax
export controls on encryption products.  On April 15, Secretary of Commerce Daley made
a speech announcing the release of a new report on electronic commerce wherein he said that
although the Administration’s policy was the right one, its implementation was a failure.  He
urged both industry and government to strive harder to reach consensus on the issue.
In April 1998, Undersecretary of Commerce Reinsch commented at a Congressional
Internet Caucus meeting that the Administration was not currently looking for a legislative
solution to the encryption issue.  In 1997, however, he had outlined key aspects of proposed
legislation that was being drafted within the Administration.  A version of the draft legislation
was made available on the Web site of a group opposed to export controls, but the
Department of Commerce would neither confirm nor deny it was a draft of the bill.  Two
months later, Mr. Reinsch said that the Administration had decided not to propose legislation
at that time.  Following FBI Director Louis Freeh’s testimony to the Senate Judiciary
Committee on September 3, 1997 (see Senate Judiciary Committee), the existence of
another administration draft bill, dated a week before the hearing, became widely known that
reflected Freeh’s comments about the need for domestic use restrictions.  Mr. Reinsch stated
the next day that Freeh’s comments reflected the FBI’s view, not the Administration’s, and
did not indicate a change in Administration policy.  Vice President Gore stated on September
9 that the Administration was not changing its policy.  A spokeswoman for Mr. Gore later
said the draft bill was “technical assistance” requested by Congress.  On September 11, the
House Intelligence Committee approved an amendment to H.R. 695 similar to Freeh’s
position about the need for key recovery to be built into encryption products. 
Industry Reaction
Many participants in this debate agree that market forces will lead to the development
of key recovery-based encryption products for stored data because companies and individuals
will want to be able to replace lost, stolen or corrupted keys.  The debate is over the
government’s role in “encouraging” the development of key recovery products through
export regulations, and the access government wants to the keys.  Also of concern is the
government’s inclusion of other electronic communications.
Many computer companies continue to argue against the Administration’s policy, but
many also are moving forward in developing key recovery products that satisfy the new
policy.  A group of companies formed the Key Recovery Alliance [www.kra.org] in 1996 to
focus on identifying barriers to the development of marketable key recovery products.  KRA
has over 60 members, including Hewlett-Packard, IBM, Intel, NEC, RSA, and UPS.  In April,
1998, Mr. Reinsch stated that the Department of Commerce had approved about 50
applications that had been submitted together with commitment plans for key recovery.  While
continuing his strong opposition to the government’s encryption policy, James Barksdale,




On March 4, 1998, a group of more than 100 companies and organizations (including
some who also are members of the Key Recovery Alliance) formed the Americans for
Computer Privacy (ACP) coalition [www.computerprivacy.org].  The group is lobbying in
favor of using strong encryption, against export controls on strong encryption, and against
mandatory key recovery.  Among the members are Netscape, Microsoft, Sybase, the National
Rifle Association, the Law Enforcement Alliance of America, and the Business Software
Alliance.  ACP is widely credited as having been influential in drafting S. 2067.
On another front, Network Associates announced in March 1998 that it had arranged
for a Swiss company to develop its own software product using specifications in a book by
Philip Zimmerman, the creator of Pretty Good Privacy (PGP).  Network Associates bought
Mr. Zimmerman’s company in 1997.   PGP is a 128-bit encryption product that does not
incorporate key recovery and hence could not be exported under the current regulations.  (An
older version is available via the Internet, however, which sparked a multi-year Justice
Department investigation of Mr. Zimmerman that resulted in no action against him).  Since
the book may be exported, and the Swiss company received no technical assistance from
Network Associates, the company believes no laws were broken.  The Swiss product will be
sold by a Dutch firm using the PGP name.  Opponents of encryption controls point to this as
evidence that the U.S. government cannot control the spread of non-key recovery encryption.
The Commerce Department said it would look closely into the arrangement.
NRC Report
In May 1996, the National Research Council (NRC) released a comprehensive report
entitled Cryptography’s Role in Securing the Information Society (the “CRISIS” report).  It
stressed that national policy should make cryptography broadly available to all legitimate
elements of society, promote continued economic growth and leadership of key U.S.
industries, and ensure public safety and protection against foreign and domestic threats.
Among the recommendations:  key escrow is an unproven technology and the government
should experiment with it and work with other nations, but not aggressively promote it now;
export controls should be relaxed progressively, but not eliminated; and encryption policy
issues can be debated adequately in public without relying upon classified information. The
report also recommended that no law should bar the manufacture, sale or use of any form of
encryption within the United States; and government should promote information security in
the private sector.  Importantly, the report underscored that utilization of strong encryption
and law enforcement objectives can be mutually compatible.
Action in the 105th Congress
Three bills in the House and four in the Senate concerning encryption or related issues
have been introduced in the 105th Congress; one has passed the House (H.R. 1903).  Three
(H.R. 695, S. 376, and S. 377) are versions of bills considered in the 104th Congress and
generally favor relaxed encryption export controls (S. 376 also deals with the issue of key
recovery agents).  Four new bills also have been introduced.  The McCain/Kerrey/Hollings
bill, S. 909, reflects a philosophy closer to that of the Clinton Administration than the three
previous bills.  Representative Sensenbrenner’s bill (H.R. 1903) focuses broadly on computer
security issues and the role of the NIST.  Representative Markey’s bill (H.R. 1964) focuses
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broadly on computer privacy and security issues.  Senator Ashcroft’s bill is generally viewed
as pro-industry and pro-privacy.  Hearings have been held by six House committees
(Commerce, International Relations, Intelligence, Judiciary, National Security, and Science)
and two Senate committees (Judiciary; and Commerce, Science, and Transportation).
H.R. 695:  Security and Freedom Through Encryption (SAFE)
On February 12, 1997, Representative Goodlatte introduced H.R. 695.  Originally
referred to the Committees on Judiciary and International Relations, on June 26, it was
additionally referred to the Committees on Commerce, National Security, and Intelligence.
Several hearings have been held (see Legislation). All five committees have completed
markup.  A summary of the amendments adopted by the various committees, some of which
significantly change the character of the original bill, is shown in the following table.  The next
step is for the Rules Committee to determine which, if any, of these versions will be the
vehicle for further action.
H.R. 695
Version Comments
As introduced Section 2 defines terms, codifies existing domestic use policy, prohibits
February 12 mandatory use of key recovery, prohibits requiring anyone in lawful posses-
sion of a key to turn that key over to another person except for law enforce-
ment personnel acting under law, and makes it a crime to use encryption in
furtherance of crime; Section 3 gives Secretary of Commerce exclusive
jurisdiction over export of commercial encryption, and prohibits export
controls on "generally available" commercial encryption except for military
end-uses or to identified individuals or organization in specific foreign
countries.
As reported Adopted amendments (voice) that make technical changes to the definitions;
from House exempt members of intelligence community (as well as law enforcement)
Judiciary May from the prohibition against getting encryption key if acting under law;
22 (H.Rept. clarify that the new crime of using encryption in the commission of a crime
105-108 Pt. I) applies only to the use of encryption to avoid detection of some other federal
felony and only when it is knowingly and willfully used to avoid detection;
and add a fourth section that directs the attorney general to collect data on
cases in which encryption has interfered with, impeded, or obstructed the
ability of the Justice Department to enforce law.
As reported Adopted amendment (unanimous consent) approved by subcommittee that
from House removes the distinction between mass market and customized software;
International expands section 3 to include consumer products that do not necessarily fall
Relations July under the umbrella of "computing" products; broadens the scope and
25 (H.Rept. definition of "generally available" to include hardware with encryption capa-
105-108 Pt. II) bilities; and adds a fourth section regarding international cooperation.
Defeated a Gilman amendment (13-22) that would have allowed the
President to deny export licenses for national security reasons (including
"the ability of law enforcement agencies ... to combat espionage, terrorism,
illicit drugs, kidnapping, or other criminal acts, or otherwise would involve




As reported Adopted amendment (45-1) replacing Section 3 (export controls) with new
from House section that gives the Secretary of Commerce, with the concurrence of the
National Secretary of Defense, responsibility for export of encryption not controlled
Security Sept. through the Munitions List, provides that encryption products may be
12 (H.Rept. exported following a one-time review if they do not exceed the level
105-108 Pt. III) specified by the President as not harmful to national security, and directs the
President to notify Congress within 30 days of enactment and annually
thereafter on the maximum level of encryption that can be exported without
harming national security.
As reported Adopted amendment (voice) requiring exports of encryption products to
from House submit to a one-time review and include features allowing for immediate
Intelligence access to plaintext or to decryption information; requires encryption
Sept. 16 products manufactured and distributed for sale or use in, or imported for
(H.Rept. 105- sale or use into, the United States after January 31, 2000 to include features
108 Pt. IV) that provide immediate access to plaintext data or decryption information
from the encryption provider; allows for use of encryption products
currently employed even after January 31, 2000; allows for law 
enforcement access with delayed notification requirements similar to those
allowed in current wiretap statutory provisions; provides civil remedies and
criminal penalties for unlawful access to or disclosure of plaintext or
decryption information; and requires U.S. government procurement of
encryption technology that includes features allowing for immediate access
to plaintext or decryption information.  The amendment does not change law
enforcement's statutory requirements prior to intercepting oral, wire, or
electronic communications, or stored data (law enforcement must have
separate court order to have the data, including communications,
decrypted).
As reported Adopted Tauzin amendment (voice), as amended by the Markey-White
from  House amendment (40-11), that modifies section 2 by adding creation of a National
Commerce Electronics Technologies Center in the Department of Justice to help law
Sept. 29 enforcement keep pace with encryption technology; prohibits conditioning
(H.Rept. 105- laws or regulations governing issuance of certificates of authentication or
108 Pt. V). authority on a requirement to escrow or otherwise share private keys, or
conditioning licensing, labeling, or other regulatory scheme for any
encryption product on a requirement for key escrow; requires an NTIA
study on the implications of mandatory key recovery; increases penalties
and modifies language concerning use of encryption in furtherance of a
crime; and provides liability protection for those providing plaintext to law
enforcement or government entities pursuant to judicial process.  Defeated
Oxley-Manton amendment (16-35) that would have, inter alia, imposed
domestic use restrictions.
S. 376:  Encrypted Communications Privacy Act (ECPA)
On February 27, 1997, Senator Leahy introduced S. 376, the Encrypted Communication
Privacy Act of 1997.  S. 376 would prohibit mandatory use of key recovery but allow law
enforcement to access the key under court order if key recovery is used; codify existing
IB96039 07-09-98
CRS-10
domestic use policy; give the Secretary of Commerce exclusive jurisdiction over commercial
encryption exports; liberalize export controls; make it a crime to use encryption to obstruct
justice; and establish liability protection and penalties for “key holders.” The bill also
establishes procedures for foreign governments to access keys or decryption assistance.  The
Senate Judiciary Committee held a hearing on key recovery on July 9, 1997.
S. 377: Promotion of Commerce On-Line in the Digital Era (PRO-CODE)
Also on February 27, 1997, Senator Burns introduced S. 377, the PRO-CODE Act of
1997.  The bill prohibits mandatory key recovery and establishes an Information Security
Board as a forum to foster communication and coordination between industry and
government.  The bill codifies existing domestic use policy and gives the Secretary of
Commerce exclusive jurisdiction over commercial encryption exports.  It liberalizes export
controls but requires the publisher or manufacturer of encryption software or hardware to
report to the Secretary of Commerce within 30 days after exporting a product on the
product’s encryption capabilities.  The report would include the same information required
under the December 30, 1996 regulations, but would be provided after export instead of as
a condition of obtaining a license.  The Senate Commerce, Science and Transportation
Committee held a hearing on the Burns bill on March 19.  As discussed below, Senator Burns
offered a version of S. 377 as an amendment to S. 909 during markup of the latter bill, but
the amendment failed 8-12.
S. 909: The Secure Public Networks Act
On June 16, 1997, Senators McCain, Kerrey, and Hollings introduced S. 909, the Secure
Public Networks Act.  The bill was referred to the Senate Commerce, Science, and
Transportation Committee, which ordered it reported, amended, on June 19.  The report has
not been filed, however.  No hearings were held.  Briefly, the bill codifies existing domestic
use policy; establishes penalties for use of encryption in commission of a crime; encourages
but does not require use of key recovery; establishes procedures for government approval of
key recovery agents and certificate authorities; requires key recovery agents, whether or not
registered by the government, to disclose recovery information to lawfully authorized federal
or state government entities; provides liability protection for key recovery agents acting
pursuant to the Act; requires that encryption products procured by the U.S. government or
purchased with federal funds for use in secure networks be based on a “qualified system of
key recovery”, and that future encrypted communications networks established by the
government or with the use of federal funds use qualified systems of key recovery; permits
export of 56-bit encryption products without key recovery if they meet certain conditions, and
directs the President to annually review that limit and increase it for products where similar
products are widely available for export from other nations; permits export of any strength
encryption product if it is based on a qualified key recovery system and meets certain other
conditions; establishes an Information Security Board to make recommendations to the
President and Congress on a variety of issues; and allows the President to waive provisions
of the bill for national security or domestic safety and security reasons.  During markup, the
committee adopted a Kerry (MA) amendment establishing an  Encryption Export Advisory
Board (EEAB) with four government (CIA, FBI, NSA and the White House) and four
industry representatives to make recommendations on whether export exemptions should be
granted for non-key recovery products stronger than 56-bits.  Several other amendments also
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were adopted.  Senator Burns offered a version of his bill, S. 377, as an amendment to S. 909,
but it was defeated 8-12.   
On March 4, 1998, Senators McCain and Kerrey issued a press release announcing
modifications to the bill: the EEAB would be composed of eight industry and four
government representatives (instead of four from each) who would “approve levels of
encryption for export based on worldwide availability or anticipatory availability”; the
President could still veto the Board’s decisions for national security reasons, with notification
to Congress required;  U.S. companies could export products with optional recovery features
to approved end users;  use of key recovery remains optional in the United States, but when
it is used, the key could “only be obtained by the government by a court order subpoena” as
opposed to several other legal means in the original bill; and dual registration of certificate
authorities and key recovery agents was eliminated.
Senate Judiciary Committee Hearings
The Senate Judiciary Committee has requested sequential referral of S. 909 and held a
hearing on July 9, 1997 on key recovery issues that included discussion of that bill. Senator
Kerrey testified that he was willing to modify S. 909 to meet some objections.  FBI Director
Louis Freeh expressed reservations about the bill because it allows widespread use of strong
encryption within the United States regardless of whether it has key recovery.  Director Freeh
amplified his concerns at a September 3 hearing before the Subcommittee on Technology,
Terrorism, and Government Information.  He stated that he wants U.S. manufacturers to be
required to build key recovery into encryption products, and that imported encryption
products also be required to include key recovery.  He further stated that there were different
methods for achieving the goal of immediate lawful decryption: “That could be done in a
mandatory manner.  It could be done in an involuntary manner. ...”  He later added that he
thought legislation should first include the requirement that key recovery be built into
encryption products and “then take up the more complex discussion about how that’s
enabled....” He also stated that Internet Service Providers should be required to have the
capability to decrypt communications immediately. He stressed that the FBI was not asking
for any new authorities, that it is a matter of technically being able to do tomorrow what they
can do today in terms of monitoring criminals and terrorists.  At a hearing the next day before
the House Commerce Committee, Undersecretary of Commerce Reinsch stated that Director
Freeh was speaking for the FBI and not the Administration (see Clinton Administration
Policy: Current Policy). On March 17, 1998, the Subcommittee on Constitution, Federalism,
and Property Rights held another encryption hearing (see S. 2067, below). 
S. 2067: Encryption Protects the Rights of Individuals from Violation and
Abuse in Cyberspace (E-PRIVACY) Act
Senator Ashcroft et al. introduced S. 2067, the E-PRIVACY Act, on May 12, 1998.
The bill was referred to the Senate Judiciary Committee.  Senator Ashcroft’s Subcommittee
on Constitution, Federalism, and Property Rights had held a hearing on the issue on March
17, 1998, that primarily addressed the constitutionality of requiring the use of key recovery.
S. 2067 prohibits mandatory key recovery and codifies existing domestic use policy.  The bill
prohibits federal or state agencies from linking the use of encryption for authentication or
identification to the use of encryption for confidentiality purposes; requires that the use of
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encryption products be voluntary and market-driven; and authorizes government agencies to
purchase encryption products, but such products that use key recovery must be interoperable
with commercial encryption products.  Procedures are set forth for U.S. and foreign law
enforcement agencies to access decryption keys or assistance in decrypting electronic
communications or stored data.  Included is establishment of a National Electronic
Technologies Center (NET Center) to help law enforcement keep pace with encryption
technology.  Use of encryption to obstruct justice would be a crime.  The bill gives the
Secretary of Commerce exclusive control over commercial encryption product exports; allows
export of generally available encryption products after a one-time review except for products
designed or modified for military use; permits unrestricted export of customized encryption
hardware and software products if a comparable product is or will be available within 18
months from foreign sources; establishes an Encryption Export Advisory Board to determine
whether comparable foreign products are commercially available; prohibits restrictions on
encryption exports for non-confidentiality purposes; and provides that nothing in the Act
limits the President’s authority to prohibit export of encryption products to countries that
support international terrorism or to impose embargoes on exports to or imports from a
specific country.  The bill also provides that the contents of electronic records in networked
electronic storage be treated in law as though the record had remained in the possession of
the person who created the record and that government entities may only access the contents
of the record under circumstances specified in the bill.  The bill also has provisions regarding
the circumstances under which the government may require a mobile electronic
communication service to reveal the real-time physical location of a subscriber, and may
obtain information from pen register and trap and trace devices.
H.R. 1903: The Computer Security Enhancement Act of 1997
Representative Sensenbrenner introduced the Computer Security Enhancement Act,
H.R. 1903, on June 17, 1997.  The House Science Committee’s Technology Subcommittee
held a hearing on June 19, and the bill was reported on September 3 (H.Rept.  105-243). The
bill amends and updates the Computer Security Act of 1987, enhancing the role of the
National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST).  As passed by the House on
September 16, the bill requires NIST to promote the use of commercial-off-the-shelf
encryption products by civilian government agencies; clarifies that NIST standards and
guidelines are not intended as restrictions on the production or use of encryption by the
private sector; provides funding for computer security fellowships at NIST; and requires the
National Research Council to conduct a study of public key infrastructures.  A section that
required NIST to develop standardized tests and procedures to evaluate the strength of
foreign encryption products was removed before passage.  The bill was referred to the Senate
Commerce Committee, which held a computer security hearing on February 10, 1998.
H.R. 1964: Communications Privacy and Consumer Empowerment Act
Representative Markey introduced H.R. 1964 on June 19.  The bill covers a range of
computer privacy and security issues, and was referred to the Commerce Committee.  With
regard to encryption, section 203 of the bill would codify existing domestic use policy,
prohibit the government (federal or state) from conditioning the issuance of certificates of
authentication or certificates of authority upon use of key recovery systems, and prohibit the
government (federal or state) from establishing a licensing, labeling or other regulatory
scheme that requires key escrow as a condition of licensing or regulatory approval.  The bill
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also requires the National Telecommunications and Information Administration (NTIA) to
conduct a study on, inter alia, how data security issues affect electronic commerce, including
identification of generally available technologies for improving data security.  Such
technologies would include encryption.
Issues
Key Recovery
Key recovery is the fundamental tenet of the Clinton Administration policy.  The
Administration wants law enforcement access to keys for encrypted data stored by computers,
transmitted between computers, or other types of electronic communications. Not only does
the Administration view this as critical for U.S. users, but it seeks creation of a global key
management infrastructure (KMI) to ensure confidentiality for the growth of global electronic
commerce, and monitoring undesirable activity (by terrorists, drug cartels, or child
pornographers, for example).
Many opponents of encryption controls agree that key recovery has advantages for
recovering a lost, stolen, or corrupted key, but believe market forces will drive the
development of a KMI for stored computer data without government involvement.  Less
likely is a market-driven demand for key recovery products for electronic communications.
In any case, opponents of controls insist that the government should have no role in choosing
who holds the keys.  They fear the government will have unfettered access to private files and
communications, though the Clinton Administration stresses that proper legal authorization
will be required.  Liability protection for proper release of keys, and penalties for improper
use or release of keys, is an important aspect of Administration policy.
Questions about technical vulnerabilities that could be introduced if key recovery is
incorporated into computer systems were raised in a May 1997 report, The Risks of Key
Recovery, Key Escrow, and Trusted Third Party Encryption, by an ad hoc group of crypto-
graphers and computer scientists.  They concluded that key recovery “introduces a new and
vulnerable path to the unauthorized recovery of data” and the “massive deployment of
key-recovery-based infrastructures to meet law enforcement’s specifications will require
significant sacrifices in security and convenience and substantially increased costs....”
The Administration notes that global agreement on the need for key recovery and a
global KMI is essential to its policy and has been working with the Organization for
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) to develop guidelines for a global KMI.
On March 27, 1997, the OECD released those guidelines which include 8 principles. Principle
6 states that “national cryptography policies may allow lawful access to plaintext, or
cryptographic keys, or encrypted data” (emphasis added).   Hence, OECD neither endorsed
nor rejected the concept of law enforcement access to decryption keys.  The European
Commission published a communication in October 1997 that noted the need for strong
encryption to advance electronic commerce and expressed strong reservations about




Using the export process to influence the type of encryption products that are available
in the United States and abroad is one strategy of the Clinton Administration policy.  The
Administration points to threats to national security and public safety that would arise if
criminals and terrorists used encryption that the U.S. government could not decrypt.
Administration representatives argue that the National Security Agency (NSA), for example,
has been able to thwart criminals and terrorists because NSA intercepted communications in
time; if those communications had been encrypted with strong encryption, their task would
have been much more difficult.  NSA expresses particular concern about passing a law that
does not require companies to notify the government of what encryption products are being
exported and to whom.  Others point to difficulties in stopping future attacks such as that in
Oklahoma City in an era when terrorists could use strong encryption. 
Opponents of the Administration’s policy counter that the United States, through export
controls, cannot prevent access to strong non-key recovery encryption by criminals and
terrorists because it is already available elsewhere in the world.  They further point out that
the current policy of no restrictions on domestic use or import of encryption means that
domestic threats would not be affected.
The Administration is using the export process to encourage companies to develop
products with key recovery features.  There are no limits on the strength of encryption
products that can be exported if they include key recovery.  Opponents of export controls
object to the government essentially mandating the use of key recovery, arguing that foreign
companies are not bound by such restrictions.  They argue that customers who do not want
U.S. law enforcement or national security agencies having access to decryption keys will buy
encryption products from foreign suppliers.  They insist that the U.S. government cannot
control the availability of strong non-key recovery encryption products, since they already can
be procured from foreign suppliers, or downloaded from the Internet.   They assert U.S.
policies simply ensure that U.S. companies will lose market share to foreign competitors and
will not achieve the overall objective of assuring law enforcement access to encrypted
information of criminal groups.  They point out that drug cartels, for example, could develop
their own encryption products rather than buying commercially available products that would
allow governments to access the keys.
Proponents of export controls concede that some criminal groups may develop their own
encryption, but insist that at some point they will have to interact with mainstream companies
(such as banks or airlines).  If the mainstream companies are using key recovery-based
systems, this would provide an opportunity for law enforcement to access at least some of the
groups’ activities.  They also point out that even though law enforcement agencies have been
allowed to tap telephone lines for decades, criminals still use telephones because the
infrastructure is already in place, easily used, and less costly than building an alternative
system for their own use.  As for foreign competition, proponents argue that although some
strong non-key recovery products are available from the Internet or foreign suppliers, they
are not widely used and some are not as strong as their advertisements claim.
Some cases involving encryption export controls have been the basis for legal action.
One involves University of Illinois Professor Daniel Bernstein and his attempts to publish,
both in print and on the Internet, the source code for his Snuffle encryption algorithm.  The
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government argued that the export required a license under the Arms Export Control Act
(AECA) and the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR) through which AECA is
implemented.  On April 15, 1996, U.S. District Judge Marilyn Patel ruled that computer
source code is “speech” and protected under the Constitution.  On December 18, she further
ruled that ITAR represents an unconstitutional prior restraint on free speech. Following the
December 30, 1996 shift in jurisdiction over commercial export products from the State
Department to the Commerce Department, Bernstein’s lawyers asked her to review the new
regulations, too.  On August 25, 1997 she ruled that the new regulations also violate the First
Amendment.   The government has appealed the ruling.  Arguments were heard December
8, 1997. An opposite ruling was made in March 1996 by Judge Charles Richey in a case
involving Philip Karn.  Mr. Karn was denied permission to export source code on diskette
even though the source code had been published in a book and hence was in the public
domain.  The State Department designated the diskette as a “defense article” under AECA
and denied its export.  Judge Richey dismissed the complaint because the AECA does not
permit judicial review of what is designated by the President as a “defense article.”  Mr. Karn
appealed the ruling, but by the time the appeal was heard in January 1997, the export
regulations had changed so the case was remanded back to DC District Court.
Domestic Use
The focus of the encryption debate shifted in September 1997 to include potential
changes to domestic use policy.  Current U.S. policy allows any type of encryption to be used
in or imported into the United States.  Administration concerns that attempting to change this
policy would be unsuccessful was a factor in its choice of using export controls to influence
what encryption products are available for domestic use.  FBI Director Freeh’s testimony to
the Senate Judiciary Committee on September 3 (described above) heralded a shift in the
debate towards the possibility of requiring that key recovery be built into products
manufactured in or imported into the United States, and possibly enabled by the manufacturer,
not only the user.  The Administration asserts that its policy has not changed.  Language
similar to that enunciated by Director Freeh was included in the House Intelligence
Committee’s action on H.R. 695.  An Oxley-Manton amendment to the bill that would have,
inter alia, imposed domestic use restrictions was defeated (16-35) during markup by the
House Commerce Committee.
LEGISLATION
H.R. 695 (Goodlatte, et al.)
Safety and Freedom through Encryption (SAFE) Act.  Introduced February 12, 1997;
referred to Committees on Judiciary and International Relations. On June 26, also referred
to Committees on Commerce, National Security, and Intelligence.  Hearings held March 20
by Judiciary; May 8 by International Relations; July 30 by National Security; September 4 by
Commerce; and September 9 by Intelligence.  Reported from Judiciary Committee May 22
(H.Rept. 105-108 Part I); from International Relations Committee July 25 (H.Rept. 105-108
Part II); from National Security Committee September 12 (H.Rept. 105-108 Part III); from
Intelligence Committee September 16 (H.Rept. 105-108 Part IV); and from Commerce
Committee September 29 (H.Rept. 105-108 Part V).
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H.R. 1903 (Sensenbrenner et al.)
Computer Security Enhancement Act.  Introduced June 17, 1997; referred to Committee
on Science. Hearing by Subcommittee on Technology held June 19. Reported from Science
Committee September 3 (H.Rept. 105-243).  Passed House under suspension September 16
after section 7 was removed.
H.R. 1964 (Markey)
Communications Privacy and Consumer Empowerment Act.  Introduced June 19, 1997;
referred to Committee on Commerce.
S. 376 (Leahy, et al.)
Encrypted Communications Privacy Act of 1997.  Introduced February 27, 1997;
referred to Committee on Judiciary.  Hearing on key recovery held July 9.
S. 377 (Burns, et al.)
Promotion of Commerce On-Line in the Digital Era (PRO-CODE) Act of 1997.
Introduced February 27, 1997; referred to Committee on Commerce, Science, and
Transportation.  Hearing held March 19.
S. 909 (McCain, et al.)
Secure Public Networks Act.  Introduced June 16, 1997; ordered reported from
Commerce, Science and Transportation Committee June 19.
S. 2067 (Ashcroft, et al.)
Encryption Protects the Rights of Individuals from Violation and Abuse in CYberspace
(E-PRIVACY).  Introduced May 12, 1998; referred to Committee on Judiciary.  Hearing on
topic held March 17, 1998.
